DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT QC | LIBERAL GOVERNMENT WAIVES SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, VIOLATES RULE OF LAW The Liberal government (QLP 2003-) entertains -- through acts and omissions of its Ministries -- a democratic deficit attributable in part to lack of acknowledgment of a constitutional Legal Order. The Liberal government's conduct, as well as it's actions pursuant to the refusal to comply with the Rule of Law, constitutes a parliamentary and constitutional coup d'État, a fraud upon the Canadian Constitution, with Legislative and judicial usurpation resulting in the violation and denial of the rights and freedoms of all Quebec taxpayers. On June 1992, the Quebec Liberal government forced through gag order the adoption of Bill 406 comprised of rules governing the administration of a Law Reform Institute (S.Q. 1992, c. 43) ; A democratic deficit occurs when "ostensibly democratic organizations or institutions fall short of fulfilling what are believed to be the principles of democracy" (Sanford Levinson, 2007. See: IPU Universal Declaration on Democracy); The current prevailing effect of Quebec's democratic deficit stems in part through lack of enforcement of the Act respecting the Institut québécois de réforme du droit (S.Q. 1992, c. 43) ; The political malaise is compounded by derogatory acts ministries entertain when Supreme Law is thwarted by unconstitutional State prerogatives (Meeting of the Conseil des ministres, Decision no. 97-092 - April 16, 1997; Resolution of the national Assembly of Quebec - June 14, 2007) ; The recent consolidation of two affected Ministries ( 2007.04.18 - 2008.12.18 ) exposes the Attorney General's incongruent role as guardian of the public interest. An ineffectual checks and balance system - endangering the independence of the judiciary - derives in part from the conflictual nature of the AG's legislative capacity as acting Minister of Public Security and Minister of Justice, with the judicial branch currently under coercive influence of the Executive (ASSNAT - Cérémonie de prestation de serment du nouveau Conseil des ministres - 18 avril 2007 ; R.S.Q. c. M-19, art. 3) ; The Executive Council chooses "sympathizers" to serve on committees for judicial nominations where they are teamed with a representative of the judiciary and the Bar. These observers are likely to indicate to candidates or political apparatchiks who were among those proposed to the magistrate. Candidate names are retained for one year and communicable to Liberal Party fundraisers and the entire Council of Ministers. The final decision on Quebec judicial appointments is not made by Quebec's justice minister alone, but is done in consultation with the rest of the cabinet. Every minister, including the Prime Minister, must collect annually $100 000 in donations. 10 of 23 lawyers appointed as judges to the Court of Quebec since February 2007 had already contributed to the Liberal electoral fund ; The Executive Council controls all legal aspects pertaining to anti-corruption measures deployed by police authorities with regards to accusations brought against elected and nominated officials. Crown prosecutors handle cases of corruption in accordance with outdated legislation, with government officials and judges suspected of corrupt practices filtered through a process aimed at protecting government interests. Members of the judiciary, comprised of civil / public servants acting as Chief Justice; judge; lawyer; and court staff, commit denials of justice where evidence of prevarication, instigated by members of the judiciary, is revealed ; The lack of legal redress available to individuals when governments fail to implement the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stems from: the insufficient coverage in domestic legislation of economic, social and cultural rights as spelled out in the Covenant; the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms for these rights; the practice of governments of urging upon their courts an interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms denying protection of Covenant rights, and the inadequate availability of civil legal aid, particularly for economic, social and cultural rights (UN - Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, May 22, 2006) ; In accordance with a submission that had already been expressed in the Law on the National Assembly of Quebec (1982), the 1984 parliamentary reform, according to a Report, should have given priority on control, by the Assembly, of public spending and acts of government including its administration so as to better embody the principle of separation of legislative and executive powers. The parliamentary reform of 2009, which succeeds previous reforms, omits any legislative restructuring aimed at increasing parliamentary scrutiny. As previously denounced by the Comité de réflexion sur le travail des commissions, and still in effect to date: [TRANSLATION]: [T]he debate in parliamentary committee is dominated by dialogue between a minister and a spokesman of the opposition, or between the minister and witnesses invited by the commission. The participation of all other members of the Commission becomes trivial. [...] [T]he presence and involvement of a minister in committee [makes] the debate more political and often overly partisan. Given the stakes, the ministers cabinets, leaders and parliamentary whips have obtained, over the years, to be informed about all aspects of the work of the committees, which led them to interfere in the organization, conduct and monitoring of their meetings. This is visible not only in terms of organization of the Assembly, but also of that covering initiatives and supervisory mandates when it is considered that the question investigated by a commission is potentially capable of embarrassing the government (ASSNAT - De la Nécessité du Contrôle Parlementaire - Comité de réflexion sur le travail des commissions, Juin 2000) ;
Sample Data retrieved from public and private sources depicts systemic usurpation among targeted sectors of government. Preliminary analysis of the effects of Quebec's unconstitutional public administration reveals the criminal trend. Diagram below illustrates the predisposition towards non-compliance to the Rule of Law :
RULE OF LAW > Quebec > QLP 2003-2010 (Ø = Null)
IMPORTANT: A forthcoming Preliminary Report shall comprise a concise analysis and consolidation of select cases depicting unruly governing acts and omissions of the Liberal government. A subsequent Full Report shall provide a thorough analysis and Rule of Law Index depicting the status of the Rule of Law within Quebec's governing apparatus. Note: Report availability to be announced via the UPDATES section - see UPDATES RSS feed for consultation of release dates. - AMENDED 2011.03.26 - |